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We provide a welfare analysis of early elections in a dynamic model of political competi-
tion with endogenous political blockades. Blockades arise if a party wins an election due to
the support of voters with extreme policy preferences. We show that ﬂexible election timing
has the advantage that political blockades are overcome and political decisions are taken more
frequently, but also the disadvantage that these decisions are of a lower quality. We argue that
the disadvantage of early elections is likely to dominate, but that time-consistency problems
make a constitutional ban on early elections diﬃcult to maintain in a parliamentary democracy.
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Throughout a large part of the democratic world, the timing of general elections is ﬂexible; that
is, the government has the constitutional right to call an early election. However, the use that
is made of this right is typically controversial. For instance, Margaret Thatcher was accused of
“cutting and running” when she called an election in 1983, shortly before the inﬂation rate went
up, and thereby capitalized on high polls in the nick of time. Generally, a snap election is met with
criticism whenever the feeling prevails that the reasons behind it are purely tactical.
Faced with this critique, politicians try to justify their calling of early elections. One possible
route is to argue that unexpected political developments imply that the government needs a timely
new mandate from the electorate. Alternatively, early elections are often argued to be a means
of ending a political crisis. Both arguments were used in Germany in 2005, when chancellor
Gerhard Schr¨ oder called an early election. He argued that “without a new mandate my political
programme cannot be carried forward” (The Independent, 2 July 2005). The German president,
whose consent was needed for an early election to take place, emphasized the country’s exigent need
of a strong government capable of enforcing needful though controversial reforms. Similarly, Japan’s
prime minister in 2005, Jun’ichiro Koizumi, justiﬁed calling an early election with the purpose of
pursuing a controversial reform (the privatization of the national post) against the opposition in
the parliament.
These examples illustrate that there are acceptable reasons for an early election, such as the
need for a new mandate or the need to overcome a political crisis, and illegitimate or purely tactical
reasons, such as the incumbent government’s chance of winning an early election. The question
that is naturally implied by this distinction is: Are voters who are facing an upcoming snap election
able to discern whether the motives behind it are legitimate or not?
To see the bearing of this question, suppose for the moment that the answer was Yes. Then,
voters would be in the position to punish politicians with illegitimate motives for an early election.
They would simply refrain from reelecting them. Thus, any wise government would, in turn, refrain
from initiating a snap election for the wrong reason; and the problem, if there was any, would be
solved by self-regulation of the democratic system.
The situation is diﬀerent if voters are not able to discern the motives behind an upcoming
snap election. An agency problem arises because politicians remain undetected if they appeal to
legitimate reasons in order to justify an illegitimate early election. In this case, constitutional law
must either allow early elections in general or ban them in general. This raises the question about
the criteria according to which such a constitutional decision has to be made. How should the
possibility of both legitimate and illegitimate early elections aﬀect the assessment of early elections
at the constitutional level?
To address these questions, this paper develops a model in which both legitimate and illegit-
imate reasons for early elections are clearly deﬁned, and in which a welfare analysis of diﬀerent
constitutional rules can be carried out. Our focus lies on political blockades, i.e., on situations
where a government lacks parliamentary support for the policy it seeks to implement. In this con-
text, a legitimate early election would be one where the government “really” has a political project
whose implementation is impeded, as opposed to a case where the government only behaves as if
1it had such a project.
The questions we seek to address in this paper demand various innovations in the modelling of
political competition. Existing models are not easily adapted so as to provide a “satisfactory”
theory of what political outcomes are with and without early elections. The main diﬃculties are
the following:
First, to analyze early elections as a means of overcoming political blockades, a model is needed
in which political blockades can emerge within the legislative term. Neither models of party com-
petition in the tradition of Downes (1957), nor citizen-candidate models as developed by Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) have this property. In these models, political
outcomes are ﬁxed, once the ruling party or the ruling politician has been determined.
Second, the welfare analysis of early elections requires a completely microfounded model so that
political outcomes can be traced back to the behavior and the preferences of voters. While we can
use some ideas form the important literature on the strategic termination of governments, we also
need to extend this work because it typically lacks such a microfoundation. Instead, the voters’
response to political events is taken to be an exogenous stochastic process.1
Finally, an assessment of constitutional rules should take into account that a political consti-
tution regulates a repeated interaction of politicians and citizens. An evaluation of whether or not
it is desirable to have ﬂexible election timing should therefore be based on a dynamic model that
generates a distribution of outcomes – as opposed to a static model with only one interaction.
To account for these various requirements, we adopt the following approach: We study a model
with two inﬁnitely lived parties, called L and R, who are repeatedly competing with each other.
Parties nominate candidates for elections. The winning party’s candidate, henceforth called the
prime minister, makes policy proposals, which need the approval of the ruling party to pass parlia-
ment. The prime minister is oﬃce-motivated, and, due to term limits, can be in oﬃce for at most
two legislative periods.
We assume that a prime minister may be competent or incompetent in the sense that she is
- or is not - able to identify eﬀective policies. To illustrate this, suppose that the reduction of
unemployment rates is the most urgent political problem and that there are two types of policy
measures that can be used. On the one hand, Keynesian policies would stimulate macroeconomic
activity. One the other hand, one could also choose a policy that improves individual incentives to
seek for employment, e.g., a reduction of unemployment beneﬁts. Suppose that, depending on cur-
rent economic conditions, only one of these policy measures can eﬀectively reduce unemployment.
We say that a prime minister is competent if she understands what the eﬀective policy measure is,
and is incompetent otherwise.
While in her ﬁrst term, a competent prime minister seeks to prove her competence to voters, so
as to make sure that she is renominated by her party, and reelected by the voters. However, there
1For instance, Keppo et al. (2007) use such an approach to study optimal election timing by an incumbent
government. For an earlier contribution, see also Balke (1990), Lupia and Strom (1995) and Diermeier and Merlo
(2000). Some of the literature on political business cycles has also considered ﬂexible election terms, see Chapell and
Peel (1979), L¨ achler (1982), and Kayser (2005). Again, voters are not fully modelled in these papers.
2may be a blockade so that the policy that would have to be chosen for that purpose is not accepted
by the ruling party. For instance, blockades arise in our model when (i) the competent policy is
a leftist policy, (ii) the rightist party is ruling, and (iii) the prime minister’s position is weak.2
An empirical example would be a socialist government that has to cut unemployment beneﬁts to
reduce unemployment eﬀectively, but does not ﬁnd suﬃcient support for this policy among the
members of the socialist party.
If early elections are not an option, then it is easy to see that a prime minister who is competent
but blocked is empirically indistinguishable from a prime minister who is incompetent. In both
cases, voters just observe that unemployment remained high and therefore have less conﬁdence in
the prime minister’s competence. This implies that the incumbent party prefers to nominate a
newcomer prior to the next election. Consequently, only a competent prime minister who does not
face a blockade can survive in oﬃce for two consecutive terms.
If, by contrast, early elections are possible, then a competent prime minister who is blocked
may have an incentive to use them in order to avoid being replaced at the date of the next regular
election. Whether this incentive exists depends on the voters’ beliefs, i.e., on whether voters believe
the prime minister to be likely enough to reduce unemployment, once her majority in parliament
will have become larger. Put diﬀerently, the prime minister can use an early election to gain
additional time in oﬃce if and only if voters are suﬃciently conﬁdent that she is competent.
Given such beliefs, however, early elections are attractive for any prime minister, competent or
not, who is unable, for whatever reason, to reduce unemployment prior to the next regular election.
Moreover, early elections are more often attractive for an incompetent prime minister than for a
competent one. This is because a competent prime minister, as opposed to an incompetent one,
can sometimes reduce unemployment, namely whenever the eﬀective policy is supported by the
ruling party. Thus, a competent prime minister need not always fear to be replaced after her ﬁrst
term. Thus, the rational voter believes that a prime minister who calls an early election is much
more likely to be incompetent than competent. Consequently, only if the opposition’s candidate
makes an even worse impression will the voter reelect the prime minister at an early election.
There are two conclusions from these considerations. First, voters cannot discern whether the
motives behind a given snap election are legitimate or not. The reason is that an incompetent
prime minister can always blame the need to compromise with her party for her lack of success.
Second, an early election confronts the voter with the choice between a prime minister who is
unlikely to be competent and an alternative candidate who is even worse. This follows because
the incumbent prime minister calls an early election only if she is suﬃciently likely to win. But
this requires that the opposition’s candidate must appear even less appealing to the voters.3 Thus,
whereas a constitution that bans early elections leads to too frequent replacements of competent
prime ministers, a constitution that allows for early elections does exactly the reverse: It leads to
a too frequent reelection of incompetent prime ministers.
2In our model, a prime minister is strong if it was a clear competence advantage relative to the challenger that
made her win elections, implying that she gained all voters in a neighborhood of the median voter. By contrast, her
position is weak if she just won by chance.
3A possible reason is that the opposition party is surprised enough by the timing of the election to be unable to
produce a suitable candidate. See Smith (2004) for empirical evidence on this.
3However, this downside of early elections is potentially counterbalanced by the fact that early
elections aﬀect the timing of political decisions. We assume that the major political initiatives of
a government are undertaken shortly after an election. This assumption is meant to capture a
stylized fact: In parliamentary democracies, political activity declines as the end of the legislative
period approaches. This happens for a variety of reasons. Politicians start to prepare themselves
for the upcoming election, the current leaders potentially suﬀer from a lame-duck eﬀect, or the
current government seeks to avoid controversies as the next election comes closer. Empirically, the
decline of important political decisions over a legislative term has been proved by Martin (2004).
Consequently, an early election implies that the next substantial political decision is taken
earlier. In our example, given that unemployment will not go down prior to the next regular
election, an early election oﬀers the chance that the eﬀective policy against unemployment can be
implemented immediately, rather than after the next regular election.
These considerations show that the answer to the question whether a political constitution
should include the possibility to call an early election depends on the assessment of a quality-
quantity-tradeoﬀ. On the one hand, it is more likely that an early election prolongs the career of
an incompetent prime minister. This gives rise to a negative quality eﬀect. On the other hand, the
expected time distance between two consecutive political decisions is lower in a system in which
early elections occur frequently. Thus, over time, important political decisions are taken more
frequently in such a system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple model of
political blockades. Section 3 introduces early elections to this setup. In Section 4, we study an
extended model with heterogeneous voters and uncertainty about the outcome of early elections,
that makes it possible to provide a microfoundation for political blockades and to provide a welfare
analysis of early elections. The last section contains a discussion of our results. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 A model of political blockades
Consider a country with a large number of homogeneous citizens who are inﬁnitely lived. Periods are
denoted by T ∈ {0,1,2,3,...}. Citizens are born in T = 0 either as politicians who can implement
policies or as voters who are aﬀected by policies, so that there is a large number of both types.
Their common discount factor is δ. We ﬁrst consider a model in which the timing of elections is
inﬂexible, and political decisions are taken at speciﬁc dates. Speciﬁcally, we assume that in each
second period T ∈ {1,3,5,...}, an election is held and a political decision pT ∈ [−2,2] is taken.
2.1 Voters’ utility
A policy pT aﬀects utilities of voters uT. The way in which voters’ utilities are aﬀected depends
on the state of the economy ωT, a random variable that is uniformly distributed over [−1,1]. The
random variables ωT and ωT′, for T′  = T, are assumed to be stochastically independent.
4A voter’s utility from a political decision taken in period T is given by
uT = −λ(pT,ωT) =
 
0, if pT = ωT ,
−1, otherwise.
In even periods, i.e., when no policy is implemented, voters have a default utility: uT = 0.4
2.2 Elections
To have a policy pT implemented, a politician must be elected at the beginning of that period.
Hereafter, we refer to an elected politician as the prime minister. A legislative period has the
length 2T.
The maximum period that a prime minister can stay in oﬃce comprises two legislative periods,
i.e. any politician can be reelected at most once.5 A policy pT is only implemented in the ﬁrst half
of the legislative period.
Parties
We assume that any politician is born in T = 0 as a member of one of two parties, L or R, and
that elections are always between a politician from L, and a politician from R.
Parties must nominate candidates before elections. If a party does not nominate the incumbent
prime minister, or if her prime minister has already been reelected once, the party’s candidate is
a randomly drawn party member. If the incumbent prime minister has not yet been reelected,
the ruling party has to decide whether to nominate her again, or to draw another party member
randomly instead. Hereafter, we refer to randomly drawn candidates as newcomers.
Parties are oﬃce-motivated. The per-period utility of party J, J ∈ {L,R}, amounts to
vT,J =
 
1, if J is ruling in T ,
0, otherwise.
Thus, when deciding whether to renominate the incumbent prime minister after her ﬁrst leg-
islative period, the ruling party chooses j ∈ { incumbent, newcomer} in order to maximize the
expected present value of vT,J, with expectations taken over all future uncertain events, such as
realizations of ωT, election outcomes, policy choices, etc.
The right branch of Figure 1 below gives the timing of elections, policy implementation, and
the realizations of ωT and uT.
Voting
At election date T, voters vote sincerely, in a forward looking way, i.e., at date T, a person votes
for party L only if the expected present value of his utility is larger if party L wins, and votes for
party R otherwise. If indiﬀerent, the voter ﬂips a coin.
4The utility levels 0 and −1 are based on normalizations that do not carry further meaning. In the extended
model in Section 4, we provide a richer description of preferences.
5The assumption that there is some upper bound on reelections is important for our results, but nothing hinges
on its being equal to one.
5Figure 1: Sequence of events
The right branch of this tree gives the sequence of events if there are no early elections in T = 2. The left branch
gives the sequence of events if there are early elections in T = 2.
2.3 Types of politicians
We assume that prime ministers are not necessarily competent to implement the eﬃcient policy
p∗
T = ωT. Thus, we distinguish between competent and incompetent types of politicians. If a
competent politician becomes prime minister she observes ωT, and remains uninformed otherwise.
An incompetent politician does not learn ωT. The prior probability that a politician is competent
is assumed to be equal to 1
2. Neither politicians who are not in oﬃce nor voters can observe ωT.
Moreover, politicians are purely oﬃce-motivated: When they have been drawn to be a candidate
for elections, their per-period-utility amounts to 1 if they are in oﬃce and to 0 otherwise.
2.4 Policy implementation
The prime minister’s policy proposal must be approved by the ruling party’s members of parlia-
ment. In the given setup, we model the interaction between the prime minister and the ruling
party in reduced form.6 Here, parliament is viewed as a device D that is programmed so that it
6In the extended model in section 4, we provide a rigorous microfoundation.
6always approves the policy proposals of a “strong” prime minister, but approves those of a “weak”
prime minister only if they conform with party ideology. More speciﬁcally, we make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 In periods T ∈ {1,3,5,...}, the prime minister from party J ∈ {L,R} sends a
policy suggestion   pT ∈ [−2,2] to a device D. D is programmed as follows: If the prime minister
has already been reelected once, it implements   pT. If the prime minister has not been reelected yet,
but has won her ﬁrst election against the former incumbent, D also implements   pT. If the prime
minister has not yet been reelected and has won her ﬁrst election against another newcomer, the
following holds true: If J = L, D implements pT =   pT if   pT ∈ [−2,0] and pT = 0 otherwise. If
J = R, D implements pT =   pT if   pT ∈ [0,2] and pT = 0 otherwise.
The interpretation is as follows: A prime minister who has already been conﬁrmed in oﬃce
twice has a stronger position in parliament than a prime minister who has been conﬁrmed in oﬃce
only once. Also, a prime minister who, as a newcomer, has won her ﬁrst election against the
incumbent has a stronger position in parliament than a prime minister who has won only against
another newcomer. With a strong position in parliament, a prime minister from party L (R) can
implement both left-wing and right-wing policies, i.e., policies in the left and right half of the
interval [−2,2]. With a weak position in parliament, the prime minister from party L (R) can only
implement left-wing (right-wing) policies, i.e., policies in the interval [−2,0] ([0,2]). The strength
of position in parliament and the diﬀerences in implementable policies between strong and weak
prime ministers will be endogenized as equilibrium outcomes in section 4.
We assume that the prime minister’s policy suggestion   pT is not publicly observable. This
assumption takes to the extreme the fact that not all bargaining procedures within the government
can be observed by the public. Voters update their beliefs about the prime minister’s type after
having observed the implemented policy pT and after having realized uT. We may therefore assume,
without further loss of generality, that a prime minister chooses proposals subject to the constraint
that they will be implemented by D.7
As a tie-breaking rule, we therefore impose the following assumption.
Assumption 2 If a prime minister is indiﬀerent between various proposals that have the same
implications for her chance of winning a future election, she will choose one that maximizes voter
utility subject to being implemented by D.
2.5 The game
In sum, the game is as follows:
7That being said, if instead we assumed that policy proposals were observable, the analysis below would remain
unaﬀected, except that our proofs would involve one additional step, namely to show that, in equilibrium, voters are
unable to distinguish proposals made by competent prime ministers who cannot implement pT = ωT from proposals
made by incompetent ones.
71. Nature draws types in T = 0: There is a large number of voters, and there is also a large
number of politicians, half of whom would be competent prime ministers and half of whom
would be incompetent. A politician’s type is her private knowledge. Nature sorts politicians
into parties L and R and programs the device D.
2. Parties nominate their candidates at the end of periods T ∈ {0,2,4,...}. (A candidate can
run in at most two consecutive elections.) If a party cannot or does not want to renominate
an incumbent, it randomly draws a newcomer from among its members. Elections are held
at T ∈ {1,3,5,...}. Voters vote sincerely and ﬂip a coin if indiﬀerent. A simple majority rule
determines the winner.
3. The state of the economy, ωT, is drawn at the beginning of each time period. It is observed
by the prime minister if and only if she is competent.
4. In odd periods, the prime minister sends a policy suggestion   pT to the device D. D imple-
ments the policy pT according to Assumption 1. Voters update their beliefs about the prime
minister’s type.
5. At the end of periods T + 1 ∈ {2,4,6...}, parties nominate candidates for next elections. In
T + 2 ∈ {3,5,7,...}, elections are held again.
2.6 Equilibrium analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibria of the game. The solution concept is Reﬁned Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium which requires that the strategies of the voters, parties, and the prime
minister are mutually best responses for given beliefs about the prime minister’s type and that
beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible. The reﬁnement is a condition of stationar-
ity: Equilibrium play is the same for any two subhistories of the game that diﬀer only in calendar
time.8
Proposition 1 There is a stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Policy Outcomes: If the prime minister is incompetent, then the outcome of her policy is
uT = −1. If the prime minister is competent, the two events uT = 0 and uT = −1 have equal
probability in her ﬁrst legislative period, and uT = 0 in her second legislative period.
• Nomination decisions: The ruling party in T nominates the prime minister for elections in
T + 2 only if uT = 0, provided that the prime minister has not been reelected already. In all
other cases, the party nominates a newcomer.
• Election Outcomes: The prime minister runs for a second term only if she has proven to
be competent, uT = 0. In this case her party wins with certainty. Otherwise, both parties
nominate a newcomer, and each of them wins with probability 1
2.
8Therefore, we will omit time indices when this does not create confusion.
8Proposition 1 is our benchmark case of a political equilibrium with blockades. Its main feature
is that a prime minister needs to prove her competence (by means of generating the good outcome
u = 0) in order to be reelected. Moreover, there are situations in which a competent prime minister
is blocked in the following sense: the policy choice that would reveal her competence is not approved
by parliament (i.e., by D). Consequently, a blocked competent prime minister and an incompetent
one are empirically indistinguishable from the perspective of voters. Conditional on u = −1, the
probability that the prime minister is competent equals
Pr(u = −1 | comp.) Pr(comp.)





which is less than 1
2, i.e., less than the probability that a newcomer would be competent. Hence,
after having realized a utility of −1, voters prefer a newcomer over the incumbent, which implies
that the incumbent who has produced the bad outcome −1 will not be nominated a second time
by her party. Thus, both incompetent and competent but blocked prime ministers are replaced at
the end of their ﬁrst term in oﬃce.
3 Early elections
We now extend the model of the previous section and assume that a prime minister who has been
elected in period T has the option to call for an early election in T +1, rather than waiting for the
next regular election in period T + 2. If an early election takes place, they do so after the utility
uT from the prime minister’s ﬁrst policy measure is realized. In an early election, the incumbent
runs against a newcomer.
An early election aﬀects the timing of political decision making. A prime minister’s call for
early elections makes her second legislative period start earlier if she becomes reelected. Since the
device D is programmed such that it implements any policy suggestion of the prime minister once
she has been conﬁrmed in oﬃce twice, this means that early elections indeed make it possible to
overcome a parliamentary blockade.
We impose one additional assumption to ensure that a prime minister who faces a blockade
indeed has, at least occasionally, an incentive to call an early election: With positive probability,
the opposition party “looks bad” in the middle of the term, so that the incumbent can foresee that
she herself will win the early election.9
To capture this formally, the model is extended as follows: In T = 0, nature sorts the politicians
in either party in two pools, labeled 1 and 2, respectively. A politician in pool 1 is competent with
probability 1
2, while a politician in pool 2 is competent with probability k < 1
2. Whenever there is
a regular election, pool 2 is shut down and pool 1 is open for both parties. Hence, any newcomer
running in a regular election is competent with probability 1
2 as in the basic model. However, if
there is an early election, then, with a certain probability ρ = 1
2, pool 1 is shut down and only pool
2 remains open for the opposition party. Thus, it can happen prior to an early election that the
9The empirical interpretation would be that an incumbent’s decision whether or not to call an early election is
based on publicly available poll data that document the current standing of the opposition party.
9opposition party’s candidate has to be drawn from the inferior pool 2. Whether pool 2 is relevant
is publicly observable. For computational ease, we assume hereafter that k = 1
6.10
This modelling choice is meant to capture an important diﬀerence between early and regular
elections. Early elections, or snap elections, often come as a surprise, therefore being likely to bring
with them a considerable incumbency advantage for the prime minister. The extended game, with
a decision whether or not to call an early elections is depicted in Figure 1.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
We have seen that without early elections, any prime minister, competent or not, who is unable to
deliver the good outcome u = 0 in her ﬁrst term, will be replaced by a newcomer in the subsequent
election. The following Proposition establishes that an incumbent prime minister will use an early
election to avoid replacement whenever the opposition party is weak.
Proposition 2 There exists a cutoﬀ-value   δ, so that for all δ ≤   δ, there is a stationary perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
1. Policy outcomes, nomination decisions prior to regular elections, and the outcomes of regular
elections are as described in Proposition 1.
2. Early elections take place in T +1 if and only if the preceding history is as follows: In period
T there is a regular election that is won by a newcomer and the policy outcome is uT = −1.
At date T + 1, the opposition party’s candidate has to be drawn from pool 2.
This equilibrium is such that both an incompetent prime minister and a competent prime
minister who cannot implement p = ω initiate early elections if the opposition party is weak. More
precisely, both of them call for early elections if the opposition party must draw her candidate
for early elections from the inferior pool 2. Both of them can thereby avoid being replaced by a
newcomer in T + 2, gaining additional time in oﬃce until T + 3.
This works because, if early elections are initiated, voters infer that the prime minister is either
incompetent or that D did not implement p = ω. Consequently, they, once more, believe the prime
minister to be competent with posterior probability of 1
3. (The reasoning is the same as the one
that led to equation (1) above.) This probability, however, is larger than 1
6, i.e., larger than the
opposition’s candidate’s probability of being competent. Consequently, voters reelect the prime
minister.
The existence of the equilibrium in Proposition 2 requires that the discount factor δ does not
exceed a threshold level ˆ δ. This is due to the fact that in an early election the prime minister
can run for only one additional legislative period, and the newcomer can run for two legislative
periods. Hence, if both candidates were equally likely to be competent, the newcomer would be
more attractive for the voters because, in case of being competent, the latter can deliver the good
10There exists a critical value   k, such that our results go through whenever k ≤   k. A characterization of   k is
straightforward, but requires lengthy derivations.
10outcome p = ω twice. If δ is low enough, then the prime minister’s competence advantage dominates
this eﬀect so that she wins in an early election.
There are other stationary perfect Bayesian equilibria than the one described in Proposition 2.
In particular, the equilibrium without early elections that has been characterized in Proposition
1 survives the extension of the model. This equilibrium can be sustained by oﬀ-the-equilibrium
beliefs such that, whenever the incumbent calls for an early elections, voters believe her to be
incompetent with probability 1.
More importantly, however, there is no equilibrium that has political blockades and in which the
use that is made of early elections distinguishes an incompetent prime minister from a competent
one who cannot implement p = ω. Formally, there is no equilibrium that is fully separating,
in the sense that the action “early election” is chosen only by a competent or an incompetent
type. Suppose, for instance, that only competent prime ministers call for early elections. In such
an equilibrium, conditional on an early election taking place, voters would know that the prime
minister is competent and reelect her. But then the incompetent type would have an incentive to
mimic the competent type and also initiate an early election. Otherwise her incompetence would
be revealed prior to the next regular election and she would not get a second nomination. With
similar arguments, one can show that there is no equilibrium in which only an incompetent prime
minister initiates early elections. We summarize this reasoning in the following Proposition, which
we state without proof.
Proposition 3 There is no equilibrium in which early elections occur and in which the decision to
initiate an early election reveals the prime minister’s type.
3.2 A comparison of the two equilibria
We provide a comparison of the equilibrium without early elections in Proposition 1 and the
equilibrium with early elections in Proposition 2 in terms of a quantity and a quality measure.
Let 1Nc
T be an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if, in the equilibrium without early




T ] as a measure of competence in the equilibrium with no early elections, i.e.,
as a quality measure. Also, let 1
Np
T be an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if, in





T ] as a quantity measure. For the equilibrium with early elections, we deﬁne
the measures CE and PE in an analogous way.
Proposition 4 CN > CE and PE > PN.
The proposition establishes that the prime minister is less likely to be competent in a system
with early elections. While early elections make it possible that both a competent prime minister
and an incompetent prime minister gain additional time in oﬃce, the Proposition shows that this
eﬀect is more pronounced for the incompetent prime ministers. The reason is that a competent
prime minister will occasionally be able to prove her competence immediately, namely in those
11circumstances where D implements her suggestion   p = ω. In this case early elections are not
attractive to her because she will win the next regular election with certainty. Hence, a competent
prime minister uses early elections only occasionally, namely if D does not implement p = ω. An
incompetent prime minister, by contrast, always makes use of early elections to avoid being replaced
by a newcomer in the next regular election.
However, in the system with early elections more political decisions are taken. The reason
is that political decisions are always taken immediately after elections are held, and that with
early elections, the average time distance between two consecutive elections is strictly smaller than
without.
A welfare analysis of early elections has to compare the importance of the quantity and the
quality eﬀect. In the current setting, with normalizations so that utility equals 0 if there is compe-
tent policy and −1 otherwise, this exercise is not very interesting: Avoiding political decisions is
the dominant concern so that voters would clearly prefer the equilibrium without early elections.
We will therefore come back to this question in the context of the richer model that we introduce
in the next section.
4 An extended model
We will now study an extended model and introduce two new elements. First, we introduce
heterogeneity among voters. This makes it possible to endogenize the parliamentary blockades
that were treated as exogenous in the previous sections. In particular, we will show that there are
voters who beneﬁt from political blockades and whose support is important for the parties, so that
they, occasionally, have an incentive to block the prime minister’s policy proposals.
Second, we model election campaigns as a source of randomness such that the outcome of an
election is no longer perfectly predictable. For instance, if both parties nominate a newcomer, then
there is a probability that one candidate will outperform the other in the election campaign and win
with certainty. Also, we assume that voters can choose to abstain from an election. As will become
clear, these extensions make our model more realistic in that there are two types of elections. On
the one hand, there are elections where it is important for the parties to get enough support from
the voters with extreme policy preferences. For instance, if the very leftist voters abstained and
the very rightist participated in the election, then party R would win. This creates an incentive
for the left party to ﬁght for the votes of the very left. On the other hand, there are races where
the focus is on the voters in the middle, and the winning party is successful in getting the support
of all voters that are close to the median.
With probabilistic voting outcomes, early elections may be lost by the incumbent. As docu-
mented by Smith (2004), this happens occasionally.
4.1 Heterogeneity of voters
We introduce heterogeneity of voters by assuming that a voter is characterized by a type θ ∈ [−1,1].
If a political decision in period T is taken, then a voter realizes a utility of
u(p,ω,θ) = gT − λ(p,ω,θ) .
12The term gT is a common value component. It is a utility gain that every voter realizes if a
political decision is taken in period T.11 We assume that gT is a random variable with support
[0, ¯ g] and expected value ge. Also, the random variables gT and gT′, for T′  = T, are assumed to be
stochastically independent.
The loss function λ(p,ω,θ) depends on the chosen policy p, the state of the economy ω, and a
voter’s type θ. It is given by
λ(p,ω,θ) =

    
    
3θ2, if p = ω ,
3(θ − p)2 + 3(θ − p) + 1, if p  = ω and ω > 0 ,
3(θ − p)2 − 3(θ − p) + 1, if p  = ω and ω < 0 ,
3(θ − p)2, if p  = ω and ω = 0 .
This is a generalized quadratic loss function with the following properties: First, if voters suﬀer
from a loss equal to 3θ2, this indicates that the chosen policy was the one that matches the state
of the world, p∗ = ω.12 Second, if the policy does not match the state of the world, voters can infer
from their loss whether the policy p∗ would have been a leftist policy, a rightist policy, or neither
a leftist nor a rightist policy.13 Third, in comparison to a standard quadratic loss function (i.e.,
a loss function of the form a(θ − p)2 + b), losses are diminished or ampliﬁed, depending on voter
type and the state of the world ω. For instance, if ω < 0 (so that the policy p∗ would be leftist)
and p = 0 is chosen, then a voter with type θ < 0 suﬀers from an additional loss, whereas the loss
of a voter with type θ > 0 is reduced. This property implies, for instance, that, conditional on
ω < 0, “very” rightist voters with θ > 1
3, prefer policy p = 0 over p∗. As will become clear, this
last property will imply that, in equilibrium, these voters beneﬁt from political blockades.
Assumption 3 The distribution of voter types has full support. Moreover, there is a well-deﬁned
political middle that contains a majority of voters: there is 0 < ǫ < 1 such that 1 > G(ǫ)−G(−ǫ) >
1
2.
Assumption 3 implies that there is a fraction of voters with extreme policy preferences. In
addition, there is a neighborhood of the median voter that contains a majority of voters.
We assume that the prime minister’s preference has the same structure as in the basic model
of the previous section, i.e., the prime minister is primarily oﬃce-motivated and has a policy
motivation that breaks ties between alternatives that have the same implications for oﬃce-holding.
We assume that this policy preference now coincides with the policy preference of the median voter
θ = 0. The interpretation of this assumption is that even if the prime minister has no need to please
the median voter in order to increase her reelection probability, she behaves “opportunistically” in
the sense of maximizing the support of her policy proposals in the general public.14
11In the basic model, this term has been normalized to zero.
12In the basic model of the previous section, this corresponds to a loss of 0.
13In the basic model, this loss was set equal to 1.
14Given that the median voter’s preferred policy is a unique Condorcet winner, we can deﬁne opportunism equiv-
alently as the objective to minimize the number of voters who prefer an alternative policy over the policy proposal
of the prime minister.
134.2 Large and small majorities
In the following, we distinguish between two types of outcomes of an election: We say that a party
gains a large majority if its vote share is strictly larger than 1
2. If the vote share is exactly equal
to 1
2 and the winner of the election is determined by a coin ﬂip, we say that the ruling party’s
majority is small.
In the following we construct equilibria such that the behavior of the ruling party depends on
whether its majority is large or small. In particular if, say, party L rules with a small majority,
then it will block any policy proposals p > 0, i.e., such policy proposals will not pass parliament.
Analogously, if party R rules with a small majority no policy p < 0 will pass parliament. However,
if the ruling party’s majority is large, these constraints are no longer binding.
We will come back to the interpretation of these equilibria below. For now we want to emphasize
that parliament in these equilibria reproduces the behavior of the exogenous device D that we used
in the previous section as a reduced form model of parliament. If the prime minister has managed
to gain a large majority in an election, this implies that she has a strong position vis-´ a-vis the
parliament and can implement any policy she likes. Otherwise, her position is weak and she has to
compromise with the ruling party’s ideology.
For the game-theoretic analysis, the distinction between large and small majorities adds the
following complication. Generally, game-theoretic treatments of voting decisions give rise to mul-
tiple equilibria. In elections with only two possible outcomes, e.g., a victory for L versus a victory
for R, only one of those many equilibria survives the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
In our model, however, a voting decision now has four possible outcomes (a large majority for L,
a small majority for L, a large majority for R or a small majority for R) so that we cannot rely
on the elimination of dominated strategies. We therefore impose the following assumptions on the
voting behavior of individuals.
Assumption 4 If a large majority for one of the parties is strictly preferred by all voters with
types θ ∈ [−ǫ,ǫ], then all of these voters vote for this party.
This assumptions says that if all voters in a neighborhood of the median prefer that one of the
parties wins with a large majority, then these voters manage to coordinate their behavior in such
a way that they indeed induce their preferred outcome.
Assumption 5 Suppose that a voter is indiﬀerent between a large majority for L and a large
majority for R. Then he votes for party L if he prefers a small majority for L over a small
majority for party R, and votes for party R otherwise. In case of being indiﬀerent, he votes for
each party with probability 1
2.
For our equilibrium analysis below, this assumption ensures that the electorate splits at the
median whenever no candidate has a competence advantage after the election campaign. In this
case, all voters to the left of the median vote for L and all voters to the right of the median vote
for R.
144.3 Probabilistic Voting
Prior to any election, there is an election campaign in which one candidate may outperform the
other – in the sense that in the view of the voters she is more likely to be competent – or in which
the two candidates tie. The outcome of the election campaign inﬂuences the result of an election
and, in particular, whether the winning party has a large or a small majority.
Formally, we model the outcome of an election campaign as the realization of a random variable
β which takes values in {−1,0,1} and is generated as follows: β = αL − αR, where αL and αR are
independent random variables that take the values 0 and 1 with the following probabilities
Pr(αJ = 1 | tj = c) = Pr(αJ = 0 | tJ = i) = η ,
where tJ ∈ {c,i} is the type of party J’s candidate. We assume that η ∈ (1
2,1), so that a competent
candidate is more likely to get a good signal, αJ = 1, and an incompetent one is more likely to
get a bad signal, αJ = 0. Voters do not observe αL and αR. They only get a signal β of the
relative competence of the candidates. The informational content of β depends on the prior beliefs
of individuals on a candidate’s type. For instance, if two newcomers compete, then both are ex ante
equally likely to be of type c. If voters observe that β = 1, then the conditional probability that
the candidate from party L is competent exceeds the conditional probability that the candidate
from party R is competent. If β = 0, then both are equally likely to be of type c, etc.
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The extended model can be solved analytically.15 However, for ease of exposition, we impose in the
following the assumptions that k = 1
6, ge = 3
4, δ = 1
2, and η = 3
4. This allows us to use numerical
methods – as opposed to lengthy algebraic manipulations of inequalities – in order to illustrate the
properties of the equilibria we are analyzing.
For the same reasons as in the previous section, a constitution that enables a prime minister
to initiate early elections in the middle of a legislative period gives rise to multiple equilibria.
The following Proposition characterizes an equilibrium where early elections never arise. In this
equilibrium, voters would interpret an early election as indicating that the prime minister must be
incompetent so that the prime minister would lose with probability 1.
Proposition 5 Let ge = 3
4, δ = 1
2, and η = 3
4. Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, there is a
stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Political Blockades: If Party L (R) has a small majority, it accepts the prime minister’s
policy proposal if and only if p ≤ 0 (p ≥ 0). Otherwise it accepts any policy proposal.
• A prime minister never initiates early elections. Policy Outcomes and Nomination Decisions
are as in Proposition 1. The implemented policy is p = 0 if the prime minister is incompetent
or blocked, and p = ω, otherwise.
15In the Appendix, we explicitly derive all expressions that are relevant for a characterization of equilibrium.
15• Elections: The prime minister runs for a second term only if she has implemented p∗ = ω.
In this case her party wins with a large majority. If both parties nominate a newcomer, then
the outcome is as follows: If β = 0, there is a small majority for L or a small majority for
R, with equal probability. If β = 1, party L wins with a large majority; and if β = −1, party
R wins with a large majority.
Proposition 5 establishes that political blockades are part of an equilibrium with heterogeneous
voters. Otherwise, it establishes the same results as Proposition 1, except that there is a richer set
of election outcomes: An election where both parties nominate a newcomer does not necessarily
lead to a small majority for the winning party. If one candidate appears superior in the election
campaign, her party will win with a large majority.
The fact that voter preferences are heterogeneous implies that there are indeed voters who
beneﬁt from a political blockade. Figure 3 shows the voter types who prefer a small majority over
a large majority for party L. These voters have extreme policy preferences and hence prefer the
constraint p ≤ 0 to be in place.
Figure 2: A large majority for L vs a small majority for L











lc(θ) is the expected utility of a voter type θ conditional on a large majority for the left party and a competent
prime minister. L
sc(θ) is the expected utility conditional on a small majority and a competent prime minister. In
equilibrium, a small majority implies that the prime minister cannot implement policies p > 0.
Given the preferences of voters, we can explain the parties’ behavior when deciding about the
prime minister’s policy proposals and, in particular, why small majorities give rise to political
blockades. The formal proof in the Appendix uses standard folk theorem arguments to establish
that the left party enforces the constraint p ≤ 0 whenever it has only a small majority in parliament:
A deviation from p ≤ 0 is punished by the very leftist voters who would, in reaction to such a
deviation, abstain in future elections. The right party would therefore become more likely to win.
Thus, it is a best response for the leftist party not to accept any policy proposal p > 0.
The interpretation of this result is that the left party has an implicit contract with the leftist
voters. If the left party came into power only because of the support of the very left and then
implemented a policy that is good for the voters in the middle but bad for the very left, then the
latter would no longer support the left party. In the long run, this has detrimental consequences
16for party L so that it wants to honor this implicit contract.16
A similar argument can be used to show that, whenever the left party has a large majority,
it seeks to move as close to the median voter’s ideal policy as possible. If party L won a large
majority because it got all the voters in the middle and then implemented partisan policies that
would beneﬁt only the very left, then the voters in the middle would respond to this breach of
contract by switching to party R in future elections.
We now show that there is also an equilibrium that is analogous to Proposition 3. In particular,
both a competent prime minister who is blocked and an incompetent prime minister call for early
elections whenever the opposition party is weak.
Proposition 6 Let δ = 1
2, η = 3
4, ge = 3
4, and k = 1
6. Suppose that Assumptions Assumptions 3,
4, and 5 hold. Then there is a stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Political Blockades, Policy Outcomes, Nomination Decisions, and the outcome of regular
elections are as in Proposition 5.
• Early Elections: There are early elections in T + 1 if and only if the preceding history is as
follows:
– In T there has been a regular election with two newcomers, which has ended with a small
majority (β = 0). Moreover, the opposition party’s candidate had to be drawn from pool
2, and the preceding policy has been p = 0.
If the prime minister belongs to party L (R), this party wins and gets a large majority if
and only if β = 0 or β = 1 (β = −1). Otherwise the opposition party wins and gets a large
majority.
Proposition 6 extends Proposition 3 to a model with heterogeneous voters and probabilistic
election outcomes. In particular, the prime minister may lose in an early election. It is rational
for her ex ante to call for an early election because she is likely to win. Ex post, however, she may
regret this choice. If the candidate of the opposition party outperforms the prime minister in the
election campaign, then indeed the former will win. More precisely, if the prime minister belongs
to party L and the election campaign produces the signal β = −1, then the posterior beliefs of the
voters are such that the candidate from party R is more likely to be competent.
Moreover, after an early election there is always a large majority for the ruling party. The
information that is generated by the election campaign, and the history preceding the early election
is such that one party’s candidate has a clear advantage, in the sense of being more likely to be
competent. For voters in the middle, a large majority for the party with the more competent
candidate is their preferred outcome. By assumption, these voters form a large majority so that
their preferred outcome prevails.
16A related argument has been made (but not formalized) by Paul V. Warwick in his 2008 book on parliamentary
democracies: “To maintain the support of these individuals [i.e., voters and party members; the authors], leaders
must be able to demonstrate that their current strategy is optimal for realizing the party’s policy objectives.” (p.
144)
174.5 Welfare Analysis
We now generalize the welfare analysis that we conducted for the basic model in section 3.2. In
particular, the extended model makes it possible to answer two additional questions: First, how
does the preference for early elections depend on a voter’s type, and second, what are plausible
magnitudes for the advantages and disadvantages of early elections?
In the Appendix, we solve for the expected utility of a voter with type θ in an equilibrium
without early elections, ˜ UN(θ), and in an equilibrium with early elections, ˜ UE(θ), from an ex ante
perspective. Again we can decompose these expressions into a quantity and a quality measure and
write,
˜ UN(θ) = ˜ PNge − ˜ CN(θ) and ˜ UE(θ) = ˜ PEge − ˜ CE(θ).
Using numerical methods,17 we show that
˜ PE > ˜ PN and ˜ CN(θ) > ˜ CE(θ), for all θ.
This implies that the quantity versus quality tradeoﬀ that we derived for the basic model in Section
3.2 carries over to the extended model. Early elections lead more frequently to political decisions,
but also to a lower quality of politicians.
Our answer to the question how the diﬀerent voter types assess this trade-oﬀ is based on the
observation that ˜ CE(θ) − ˜ CN(θ) is an increasing function of | θ |. Hence, the quality disadvantage
that is implied by early elections becomes stronger the further away a voter’s type is from the
median. This is a consequence of the quadratic loss term in the utility function. Large deviations
from a voter’s ideal policy get more weight. Since equilibrium policy is oriented towards the median,
utility losses are more pronounced for voters with extreme policy preferences. More intuitively, we
have seen that the very leftist and the very rightist voters beneﬁt from political blockades. Early
elections make it possible to overcome such blockades; and as a consequence, equilibrium policy is
on average less attractive from the perspective of the voters with extreme preferences.
The following graph shows the utility diﬀerence ˜ UN(θ)− ˜ UE(θ) under the assumption that ge =
3
4. Given this value, almost every voter type, with the exception of those in a small neighborhood
of the median, would prefer a constitution that precludes early elections.
Given the speciﬁcation of our model, it is reasonable to assume that 0 ≤ ge ≤ 1. The assumption
ge ≥ 0 implies that, on average, a competent political decision that maximizes the median voter’s
utility, p = ω, is better for the median voter than not having a political decision. The assumption
ge ≤ 1 implies that, on average, an uninformed political decision, p = 0, is detrimental for the
median voter in the sense of yielding a utility level that is below 0.
Moreover, the assumption that ge ≤ 1 implies that the very leftist and the very rightist voters
are better oﬀ in the equilibrium without early elections. We can thus conclude that one has to
assume implausibly high values of ge to arrive at the conclusion that it is in the interest of all voters
to have a constitution with early elections. For the median voter, the result is not as clear-cut.
Approximatively, the median voter prefers the equilibrium with early elections if ge ≥ 3
4 and prefers
the equilibrium without early elections otherwise.
17See Figure 3 below.
18Figure 3: Utility without early elections vs utility with early elections









N(θ) is the expected utility of voter type θ from an ex ante perspective in an equilibrium without early elections.
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A Remark on Time Inconsistency
The quantity versus quality trade-oﬀ above has been evaluated from an ax ante perspective, in the
sense that the expected gains from having political decisions more frequently are weighted against
the lower quality of political decisions.
This trade-oﬀ, however, may also be assessed from an interim perspective, that is, a situa-
tion where, after a regular election in period T, voters have a precise understanding of what the
immediate gains gT+1 from a further political decision in period T + 1 are.18
Suppose that there is a status quo constitution that does not allow for early elections, and
that the current government has not performed very well and expects to be replaced at the next
regular election. Our equilibrium analysis above has made clear that the government may have an
incentive to push a constitutional reform that makes early elections possible. Moreover, if gT+1
is suﬃciently high, then this proposal will also be popular: it is supported by voters, who feel a
strong urgency to have a political decision right now, rather than after the next regular election.19
This situation may arise even though, from an ex ante perspective, voters would be happy to tie
their hands so as to have a constitution that never allows for early elections and, moreover, does
not allow for future revisions of this constitutional choice.
Certainly, there will occasionally be circumstances where politicians would love to take advan-
tage of an early election in order to gamble for additional time in oﬃce. If, at the same time, in
the general public, the feeling prevails that policy measures need to be taken today rather than
tomorrow, a proposal to change the constitution would ﬁnd suﬃcient support.
18Formally, this would be a situation where the random variable gT+1 has been drawn and its realization has been
publicly observed
19Note that these voters may perfectly foresee how the constitutional change aﬀects political outcomes in the future,
i.e., the argument does not rely on shortsightedness of voters.
195 Discussion
In almost all parliamentary democracies, election timing is at the discretion of the government.
Early elections, or snap elections, are triggered mainly for two reasons. Either the government
simply wants to capitalize on its favorable relative standing, compared to the opposition, and gain
more time in oﬃce. Or it wants to overcome a blockade in parliament. In our paper, and in contrast
to the existing literature, we have constructed a model in which both reasons for early elections are
possible and can even be present simultaneously. We have done so by taking into account that a
political blockade might also be provoked or staged by a prime minister who wants to trigger early
elections simply in order to gamble for more time in oﬃce.
The focus of our analysis has been on welfare implications. We have investigated which voters
beneﬁt and which voters lose from having a constitution that allows for early elections, as opposed
to one where the timing of elections is inﬂexible.
In the basic model, presented in section 1, we have found that in parliamentary systems with
ﬁxed election timing, competent prime ministers are too often replaced, since once a political
blockade occurs, they cannot act on their own authority any more. This result, at a ﬁrst glance,
makes plausible the widespread intuition that the government’s right to dissolve parliament is a
necessary antidote to the veto right of the parliament, counterbalancing powers of the executive
and the legislative branch.
To see whether the government’s dissolution right does indeed fulﬁll this function, we have
extended the basic model in section 2 to include the possibility of early elections. There, we have
addressed the question whether voters can separate competent but blocked prime ministers who
call for an early election to force their supposedly welfare-enhancing policy through parliament
from incompetent prime ministers who call for early elections simply to gamble for more time in
oﬃce. If this question had been answered aﬃrmnatively, this would have been a clear advantage
of a constitution that allows for early elections. However, we have found that it is impossible for
voters to discern the true motives behind an early election. Moreover, incompetent prime ministers
call for early elections more often than competent prime ministers, so that the average quality
of political decisions is lower in a system with ﬂexible election timing. These results have been
reproduced in the fully ﬂeshed model presented in section 4.
Thus, if the quality of political decisions was the only issue at stake, a constitutional ban on early
elections would be clearly favorable to voters. However, early elections also inﬂuence the timing
of political decisions: Important political decisions are made earlier in the legislative term, when
the next election campaign is still in the distant future; and consequently, more frequent elections
induce a higher frequency of salient policy measures. Thus, in a system in which voters often believe
that “something must be done immediately” by the government, allowing for early elections might
be welfare-enhancing for at least a part of the electorate. However, as we have demonstrated in
section 4, this scenario is rather unlikely to manifest itself if our model is adequate: Only a rather
high and frequent urgency of political issues can oﬀset the low average quality of political measures
implemented after early elections. In general, it is more likely that voters would be better oﬀ in a
parliamentary democracy that has a constitutional ban on early elections.
Thus, our negative answers to the normative question whether early elections are desirable lead
20to a positive question: Why do most parliamentary democracies mandate the government with the
right of calling for an early election?
At the end of section 4, we have given a tentative answer to this: Due to time-consistency
problems, a constitution that bans early elections would be diﬃcult to maintain in a parliamentary
democracy. Even if voters perfectly know that in the long run, they would be better oﬀ without
early elections, there will arise a situation at some point in time when voters would prefer imme-
diate action over competent action. At this point of time, a government that fails - deliberately
or not - to be supported by a majority in parliament can and will convince voters to change the
constitution and have early elections.
We ﬁnally add some remarks on the empirical plausibility of our model. Our model assumes that
a government is possibly blocked by parliament, and that the outcome of an election determines
whether or not this is likely to happen. In particular, the election outcome determines whether or
not the position of the government relative to the parliament is strong or weak.
Such an analysis does not apply to a presidential system where the position of the government
is strong by constitution. For instance, one might argue that the President of the U.S., who is
elected directly by the people, has a stronger position relative to the two chambers of parliament,
than, say, the German Chancellor, who is elected by the members of parliament. This might well
explain why the U.S. president is less able to attribute lack of political success to a lack of support
in parliament. Moreover, if this is true, then our analysis suggests that there is no scope for early
elections in country like the U.S. A strong government that would seek an early election, possibly
via a constitutional reform, would prove itself to be incompetent, and therefore refrains from such a
course of action. This reasoning might explain why early elections are widespread in parliamentary
democracies, but not in presidential systems.
Most parliamentary democracies, with the exception of Great Britain, are multi-party systems
in which governments typically consist of coalitions of diﬀerent parties. Although we consider only
single-party governments, the parties L and R in our model can also be interpreted as “ﬁxed”
coalitions, i.e., coalitions of one large and one small party that do not have or consider alternative
coalition partners.
In particular, our analysis is perfectly consistent with the frequent occurrence of political con-
ﬂicts within coalition governments. In our model, the fact that voters have heterogenous preferences
implies that the ruling party has to balance the policy preferences of its extreme supporters, on
the one hand, and its supporters close to the median voter, on the other hand. Particularly, if
the ruling party’s majority is small, it attributes its victory to the support of the extreme voters
and hence can accept policy proposals only if they are suﬃciently attractive to this clientele. By
contrast, if, say, party L managed to gain voters to the right of the median and therefore rules
with a large majority, then it has to deliver policies that appeal to the voters close to the median.
A small majority in our model therefore resembles a coalition government whose stability relies on
the support of an extreme party, and a large majority resembles a coalition government by several
parties who are oriented towards the center.
With this interpretation of a small majority government as an ideologically diverse coalition
government, and a large majority government as one that is ideologically homogeneous, we can ﬁnd
21empirical support for our assumption that only the former give rise to blockades and to early elec-
tions. Particularly, Warwick (2008) has shown empirically in Chapter 4 of his book that ideological
diversity within the members of a government does have a negative eﬀect on its duration.20
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22A Proofs for the basic model in Sections 2 and 3
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst derive an expression for the expected utility of voters in
the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 1). Subsequently, we verify the claims made in Proposition
1 (Lemmas 2-4).
Lemma 1 Suppose that Proposition 1 is true. Then the expected utility, UN, of a voter prior to















where UNJ is expected utility conditional on a victory of party J ∈ {L,R}. Since the prime









where UNJt is expected utility conditional on a victory of party j and prime minister type t ∈ {c,i}.
Since a type i prime minister generates u = −1 and is not nominated again,
UNJi = −1 + δ2UN , (5)
for each J.
Now suppose that the prime minister is competent. Then with probability 1
2 he generates u = 0
in his ﬁrst period, is reelected and produces the same outcome also in the next period. Otherwise,
the outcome is u = −1 in the ﬁrst period, and the subsequent election is one with two newcomers.








Equations (3)-(6) imply equation (2).
Lemma 2 Suppose that the ruling party nominates the prime minister for a second election only
if she previously generated the outcome u = 0. Then, if the prime minister is competent and in her
last period, the policy outcome is u = 0. If the prime minister is competent and in her ﬁrst period,
the outcome is u = 0 if and only if D implements p = ω. In all other cases, the outcome is u = −1.
Proof An incompetent prime minister cannot condition on the current value of ω, and hence
23always delivers u = −1. Now consider a competent prime minister. Suppose she is in her last term,
so that she no longer has career concerns and, moreover, can implement all policies. Consequently,
she chooses p = ω and u = 0. If she is in her ﬁrst term, she can ensure a second nomination only
if she is competent and the device D implements p = ω. She will hence pick p = ω, whenever D
implements it.
Lemma 3 Suppose a candidate has already proven to be competent and competes against a new-
comer. Then the competent candidate is nominated by her party and wins with certainty.
Proof If the competent candidate wins, this yields an expected utility of δ2UN for the voters. If
the newcomer wins, he will be able to implement any policy he likes. Consequently, the outcome
is u = −1 if the newcomer is competent, and the newcomer’s part will not nominate her a second
time. Otherwise the outcome is u = 0 and she will be renominated. The voters’ expected utility if









It is straightforward to show that this expression is smaller than δ2UN, for all δ ∈ (0,1). Hence, the
incumbent wins so that the incumbent’s party prefers to renominate the incumbent over nominating
a newcomer who would only win with probability 1
2.
Lemma 4 A party nominates a newcomer if the previous outcome was u = 0.
Proof Suppose the incumbent can be nominated again, and that the previous outcome was
u = 0. By Bayes’ rule, the probability that an incumbent who has generated the outcome u = 0 is
competent is given by
Pr(u = −1 | comp.) Pr(comp.)





If the incumbent is reelected the expected utility equals −2
3 + δ2UN. This is smaller than the
expected utility with a newcomer 1
2
 
−1 + δ2UN 
+ 1
2δ4UN.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst derive an expression for the expected utility of voters in
the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 5). Subsequently, we verify the claims made in Proposition
2.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Proposition 2 is true. The expected utility, UE, of a voter in an equilibrium


















where UEJ is expected utility conditional on a victory of party J ∈ {L,R}. Since the prime minister









where UEJt is expected utility conditional on a victory of party J and prime minister type t ∈ {c,i}.
A type i prime minister generates u = −1 and initiates early elections whenever the opposition
party’s candidate has to be drawn from pool 2. Otherwise she stays in oﬃce until T +2, where she
is not nominated again,







−δ + δ3UE 
, (10)
for each J.
If the prime minister is competent, she can generate u = 0 with probability 1
2. In this case she
will be nominated again and win with certainty. Otherwise, the outcome is u = −1, and there is


















Equations (8)-(11) imply equation (7).
Lemma 6 Given the behavior of voters in early and regular elections and the nomination decision
of parties, in any period where a political decision is taken, the policy outcome is u = 0 if the prime
minister is competent and D implements p = ω, and u = −1 otherwise.
Proof If the prime minister is competent and in her second period, this follows because she seeks
to maximize the voters’ utility, and D implements p = ω. If she is incompetent and in her second
period, u = −1 follows because the prime minister cannot condition her policy proposal on ω.
Now suppose she is in her ﬁrst period. If she is competent and D implements p = ω, proposing
p = ω implies that she will be nominated again and reach the maximum time in oﬃce because her
type will be revealed prior to the next regular election.
Now suppose she is incompetent or D does not implements p = ω. In this case the outcome
u = −1 results necessarily.
25Lemma 7 Consider a regular election in T + 2 where the prime minister can be nominated for a
second term. It is optimal to nominate the prime minister if and only if uT = 0.
Proof If uT = 0, then it has been revealed that the prime minister is competent. If she is
nominated her party wins with certainty. The argument is as follows. The voters expected payoﬀ
if the incumbent wins equals δ2UE. If the newcomer wins against the incumbent, D implements
any policy proposal. Hence, if the newcomer is competent he will be able to prove it and he
will be elected one more time, at the next regular election. Otherwise is incompetence is proven
(the outcome u = −1 can be attributed only to a lack of competence if D implements any policy
proposal) and he will be replaced at the next regular election. The expected payoﬀ from a newcomer
therefore equals 1
2(−1+δ2UE)+ 1
2δ4UE. It is straightforward to verify that this expression is smaller
than δ2UE.
If uT = −1, then the arguments from the Proof of Proposition 1 imply that the incumbent
is competent with probability 1
3. The expected utility if the incumbent wins is thus −2
3 + δ2UE,
which is smaller than the payoﬀ if the newcomer wins.
Lemma 8 A prime minister who is in ﬁrst period, competent and able to implement p = ω does
not initiate early elections. Suppose δ < 2
3. Then, a prime minister who who is unable to implement
p = ω. chooses early elections if and only if the opposition party’s candidate has to be drawn from
pool 2.
Proof If the prime minister is competent she can reach the maximum time in oﬃce if and only if
she proposes p = ω in her ﬁrst period and does not initiate early elections.
In the following, consider a prime minister who is unable to implement p = ω. In the hypoth-
esized equilibrium, Bayes’ rule implies that conditional on the events “early elections take place”
the probability that the prime minister is competent equals 1
3.
Suppose ﬁrst that the incumbent competes against a newcomer from the opposition party who
is drawn from pool 2 and is hence competent with probability k. Hence voters get an expected
payoﬀ of −2
3 + δ2UE if the incumbent wins.
If the newcomer wins they get γδ4UE + (1 − γ)
 
−1 + δ2UE 
, where γ = 1
2 if the newcomer is
drawn form pool 1 and γ = k if the newcomer is drawn form pool 2.
It is straightforward to verify that γ = 1
2 implies that voters prefer the newcomer. Hence, in
this case the incumbent prefers not to have an early election. Thereby she remains in oﬃce until
T + 2, rather than being replaced in T + 1.
For γ = k, voters prefer that the incumbent wins if and only if
k <
1
3(1 − (δ2 − δ4)UE
Obviously, for δ suﬃciently large, this inequality is satisﬁed for k = 1
6. Hence, the incumbent
prefers to have an early election. Thereby she remains in oﬃce until T + 3, rather than being
replaced in T + 2.
26Proof of Proposition 4
The derivation of CN, and PN follows from the same line of reasoning as the derivation of UN in
Lemma 1 and yields the following expressions:
CN =




4δ4 and PN =
1
1 − δ2 .
The derivation of CE, and PE parallels the derivation of UE in Lemma 5:
CE =
1 + δ + 1













It is now straightforward to verify that CN > CE, and PE > PN.
B Proofs for the extended model in Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds in three steps. We ﬁrst compute the utility of voters in the hypothesized
equilibrium (Lemma 9). For the second step, we take it as given that political blockades occur and
show that the prime minister’s policy proposals, the party’s nomination decisions and the behavior
of voters are mutually best responses (Lemmas 10 - 12). In the ﬁnal step, we endogenize the
political blockade (Lemmas 13 and 14).
Lemma 9 Suppose that Proposition 5 is true. The expected utility, ˜ UN(θ), of voter type θ prior to









Proof We ﬁrst compute the continuation utility ˜ UN(θ) of a voter with type θ prior to an election
campaign (i.e., before observing β) where both parties nominate a newcomer and prior to observing
the next period’s realization of g.
Suppose that both parties compete with a newcomer. We will verify below that β = 1 (β = −1)
implies that party L (R) wins with a large majority and that β = 0 implies that either party wins
with probability 1
2 and has only a small majority in case of winning. It is straightforward to verify
that all of these events occur with equal probability. Hence,
˜ UN(θ) = 1
4[Ll(θ) + Ls(θ) + Rs(θ) + Rl(θ)] (13)
where Ll(θ) is the continuation utility if party L wins with a large majority and Ls(θ) is the
continuation utility that applies if the majority is small. Rl(θ) and Rs(θ) are deﬁned in the same
way.
27The payoﬀ given that party L wins with a large majority is based on expectations about the
prime minister’s type conditional on the event β = 1,
Ll(θ) = Pr(tL = c | β = 1)Llc(θ) + Pr(tL = i | β = 1)Lli(θ)
= ηLlc(θ) + (1 − η)Lli(θ) .
(14)
Llc(θ) (Lli(θ)) is the expected continuation utility conditional on the events β = 1 and tL = c
(tL = i). In the hypothesized equilibrium, a competent prime minister stays in oﬃce for two
periods because in case of having a large majority she can reveal her type during her ﬁrst term
with probability 1, by implementing the policy p = ω. This implies
Llc(θ) = (1 + δ2)(ge − 3θ2) + δ4 ˜ UN(θ) . (15)
By contrast, an incompetent politician stays in oﬃce for only one period, and the implemented
policy is p = 0. Since his type becomes common knowledge the party nominates a newcomer in
the next regular election. This implies
Lli(θ) = (ge − 3θ2 − 1) + δ2 ˜ UN(θ) , (16)
where 3θ2 + 1 = E[λ(p,ω,θ) | p = 0,p  = ω].
If party L wins with a small majority, then, the continuation utility Ls(θ) is given by





where Lsi(θ) = Lli(θ) because the behavior of an incompetent politician does not depend on the
size of the majority. By contrast, a competent politician can choose p = ω if ω ≤ 0 and has to
choose p = 0 otherwise. Hence,
Lsc(θ) = Pr(ω ≤ 0)Lsc








b (θ) is the continuation utility that applies if the president is blocked. In an equilibrium
without early elections,
Lsc
b (θ) = (ge − 3θ2 − 3θ − 1) + δ2 ˜ UN(θ) . (19)
where 3θ2 + 3θ + 1 = E[λ(p,ω,θ) | p = 0,ω > 0].
Likewise, one can derive the corresponding expressions for Rs(θ) and Rl(θ). Substituting the
resulting formulas into (13) and using the assumption η = 3
4 yields equation (12).
Taking the political blockades as given, it follows from Lemma 2 that the policy outcome in
any period is p∗ = ω if the prime minister is competent and if there is no blockade, and p = 0
otherwise.
28Lemma 10 Consider a regular election where two newcomers are running. Party L (R) wins with
a large majority if and only if β = 1 (β = −1). If β = 0, then the winning party has a small
majority, and each party wins with probability 1
2.
Proof
Case 1. Suppose the election campaign ends with a signal in favor of the left candidate β = 1. We
show in the following that, conditional on this event, for a majority of voters a large majority for
party L is the preferred outcome of the election.
Step 1. Consider ﬁrst the comparison between a large majority for party L and a large majority
for party R. Given the posterior beliefs, the expected utility if L wins a large majority is given by
Ll(θ) whereas the expected utility if party R wins a large majority is given by
(1 − η)Rlc(θ) + ηRLi(θ) ,
where the symmetry of equilibria implies that Rlc(θ) = Llc(θ) and Lli(θ) = Rli(θ), for all θ.
Hence, a voter of type θ prefers a large majority for L over a large majority for R if and only if
Llc(θ) − Lli(θ) > 0. The following graph shows that this statement is true for all θ. Hence, all
voters prefer a large majority for the more competent candidate over a large majority for the less
competent candidate.
Figure 4: A large majority for L vs a large majority for R following β = 1








Step 2. We now investigate the set of voters who prefer a large majority for party L over a
small majority for party L. The expected utility if party L wins a small majority is given by
ηLsc(θ) + (1 − η)Lsi(θ) ,
where in an equilibrium without early elections Lsi = Lli. Hence, a voter of type θ prefers a large
majority for L over a small majority for L if and only if Llc(θ) − Lsc(θ) > 0. Figure 2 shows that
this statement is true for all θ ≥ −0.37; that is, only the voters whose ideal policy is very left
beneﬁt from a blockade.
Step 3. By symmetry, all voters with types θ ≤ 0.37 prefer a large majority for party R over a
29small majority for party R . By Step 1 all voters prefer a large majority for L over a large majority
for R. Hence, we can conclude that a all voters with types θ ≤ 0.41 prefer a large majority for
party L over a small majority for party R.
We conclude from Steps 1 - 3 that all voters with types between −0.37 and 0.37 prefer a large
majority for party L over any alternative outcome of the election. Assumption 3 implies that this
is a majority of voters. Assumption 4 implies that these voters vote for party L.
Case 2. A symmetric argument establishes that party R will win with a large majority if the
election campaign ends with a signal in favor of the right candidate, β = −1.
Case 3. Suppose that β = 0. Then, the posterior beliefs of the voters are such that both candidates
are equally likely to be competent. Moreover, both parties behave identically in case of winning
a large majority, implying that all voters are indiﬀerent between a large majority for L and large
majority for R. Consequently, a voter of type θ prefers a small majority for party L over a small
majority for party R if and only if Ls(θ) ≥ Rs(θ). A straightforward calculation shows that these
are all voters with an ideal policy to the left of the median, i.e., all voters with θ < 0.
We now show that an incumbent who had the opportunity to prove that he is competent in the
previous period will win with a large majority if he runs again.
Lemma 11 Suppose an incumbent has proven to be of type c. If nominated again, she will win
with a large majority.
Proof Consider an election where an incumbent from party R who has proven to be of type c
and runs again. If she is reelected with a large majority, a type θ voter realizes utility OCl(θ) :=
(g − 3θ2) + δ2 ˜ UN(θ).
If the candidate from the left party has a good signal, β = 1, then the expected payoﬀ from a
large majority for party L equals Y Gl(θ) := ηLlc(θ) + (1 − η)Lli(θ). Since Llc(θ) > Lli(θ) this is
an upper bound for the expected payoﬀ that is realized if L gains a large majority.
The following graph shows that OCl(θ) > Y Gl(θ), for all θ. Hence, all voters prefer a large majority
for the incumbent over a large majority for the newcomer, whatever the outcome of the election
campaign.21
The set of voters who prefer a large majority for the incumbent over a small majority for the
incumbent is given by the voters such that (g −3θ2)+δ2 ˜ UN(θ) > 1
2((g −3θ2)+δ2 ˜ UN(θ))+ 1
2((g −
3θ2+3θ−1)+δ2UN(θ)). Straightforward computations show that these are the voters with θ < 1
3.
We can use the arguments from Lemma 10 to argue that all voters with θ > −0.37 prefer a large
majority for the incumbent over a small majority for the left party. In summary, all voters with
21The inequality OC
l(θ) > Y G
l(θ) can be manipulated analytically to obtain an upper bound on η. If η was
very close to 1 then the new candidate would be almost as likely by of type c as the incumbent. Moreover, the
new candidate has the advantage of being able to run in two consecutive elections. Hence, for η very close to one
OC
l(θ) > Y G
l(θ) does not hold. By contrast, assuming that η =
3
4 implies that a competent incumbent will always
win against a newcomer.
30Figure 5: A large majority for a competent incumbent vs. a large majority for a new candidate
with a good signal









types between −0.37 and 0.33 prefer a large majority for the incumbent over any other outcome.
By assumptions 3 and 4 this implies that the incumbent wins with a large majority.
Now suppose that the policy outcome has been p = 0. From the perspective of voters this
indicates that either there has been a blockade – conditional on this event the prime minister is
competent with probability 1
2 – or there has not been a blockade and prime minister is incompetent
with probability 1. The arguments in the proof of Lemma 4 imply that in this situation all voters
with preferences in a neighborhood of the median would prefer a large majority for the newcomer
over any other outcome if the prime minister was nominated again, which implies that the prime
minister’s party prefers to nominate a newcomer. This is summarized in the following Lemma,
which we state without proof.
Lemma 12 Suppose an incumbent has implemented p = 0. If nominated, the other candidate will
win with a large majority.
We now turn to the incentives of parties to enact political blockades. Without loss of generality,
we study only the incentives for the left party. We ﬁrst derive the left party’s payoﬀs in equilibrium.








L ) , (20)
where SLl
L is the expected payoﬀ of party L conditional on winning a large majority in a regular
election where two newcomers are running. SLs
L is the expected payoﬀ in case of winning a small
majority. SRl
L and SRs
L are the payoﬀs of the left party if the right party wins. We have that
SLl





(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3 + δ4VL) +
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(1 + δ + δ2VL)
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Substituting these expressions into (20) yields
VL =
1 + δ + 1
2(η + 1
2)(δ2 + δ3)
2 − (η + 1
2)δ4 − (3
2 − η)δ2 , (21)







Intuitively, this is the present value of an inﬁnite stream of expected per period payoﬀs of 1
2, where
1
2 the probability to be in oﬃce in any one period.
Lemma 13 Suppose L has a small majority. It is optimal for the party to block any policy p ≥ 0
if it expects that otherwise leftist voters would abstain in the future whenever there is an election
where both parties nominate a newcomer and β = 0.
Proof Suppose there is an alternative equilibrium where leftist voters abstain whenever β = 0
and, as a consequence, party R gains a large majority whenever β = 0. In all other cases voting






























Substituting these expressions into (23) yields
VLA =
1
2(1 + δ) + 1
2η(δ2 + δ3)
2 − (η + 1
2)δ4 − (3
2 − η)δ2 , (24)
Assuming that a deviation aﬀects future play of leftist voters, the maximal utility that the left
party can obtain by deviating from blocking any policy p ≥ 0 is given by
1 + δ + δ2 + δ3VLA .
This is based on the assumption that the party can win the next regular election by deviating.
Thereafter, the party has to nominate a newcomer and from then one the new equilibrium payoﬀ
becomes relevant. By contrast, if the party honors its implicit contract with leftist voters, then the
payoﬀ is given by
1 + δVL .
32Straightforward calculations show that for η = 3
4 and for δ = 1
2 we have that
1 + δVL > 1 + δ + δ2 + δ3VAL .
This implies that the left party has no incentive to deviate.
Using the same argument, one can show that it is not in the party’s interest to deviate from
moving as close as possible to the median voter’s preferred policy. Suppose that the party and
the prime minister would consider a deviation such that in one period a policy that is optimal for
voters with types to the left of the median is implemented. If this implies that in future elections
all voters in a neighborhood of the median vote for party R whenever the race is close, such a
deviation is not attractive.
Lemma 14 Consider a deviation of party L that yields a short run gain for leftist voters. If this
implies that in the future voters in the middle vote for party R whenever there is an election where
both parties nominate a newcomer and β = 0, then such a deviation is not attractive.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof proceeds in three steps. We ﬁrst consider the incentives for a prime minister to call
for early elections. Lemma 15 shows that after the early election campaign, voters may consider
the opposition party’s candidate to be more competent. Lemma 16 shows that the prime minister
may want to call an early election even if the opposition party will exactly in those circumstances
where the newcomer outperforms the incumbent in the early election campaign. Second, we derive
voter utility in the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 17). Finally, we explain the steps that are
required to verify that the hypothesized behavior constitutes indeed a stationary perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Lemma 15 Let the history of events be as follows: Consider an early election with campaign
outcome β′ that takes place after voters have observed p = 0, an opposition party’s candidate who
has been drawn from pool 2, and a preceding regular election with two newcomers who tied in the
election campaign, β = 0. Suppose the prime minister belongs to party L. If 1
3 > k >
(1−η)2
(1−η)2+2η2,
then Pr(tL = c | β′) > Pr(tR = c | β′) if β = 1 or β = 0, and Pr(tL = c | β′) < Pr(tR = c | β′), if
β = −1.
Proof The probability that the prime minister is competent equals 1
3, as in the basic model in
Section 3.
Case 1. Suppose that β′ = 0. By deﬁnition of a conditional probability
Pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) =
1
3Pr(β′ = 0 | tL = c)
1
3Pr(β′ = 0 | tL = c) + 2
3Pr(β′ = 0 | tL = i)
. (25)
33The assumption that αL and αR are independent random variables implies that
Pr(β′ = 0 | tL = c) = η[kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)] + (1 − η)[k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η] , (26)
and
Pr(β′ = 0 | tL = i) = (1 − η)[kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)] + η[k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η] . (27)
Combining equations (25) - (27) yields
Pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) =
1
3{2η(1 − η) + k(2η − 1)2}
−1
3k(2η − 1)2 + 2
3{(1 − η)2 + η(1 − η) + η2}
. (28)
In a similar way we derive
Pr(tR = c | β′ = 0) =
k
 1




3k(2η − 1)2 + 2
3{(1 − η)2 + η(1 − η) + η2}
. (29)
It follows from equations (29) and (28) that
Pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) > Pr(tN = c | β′ = 0) ⇐⇒ k < 1
3 .
Case 2. Suppose that β′ = 1. Using the same arguments as in Case 1, we derive





Pr(tN = c | β′ = 1) =
k
 1
3η(1 − η) + 2
3(1 − η)2 
1
3(2 − η){k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η}
(31)
It follows that,
Pr(tL = c | β′ = 1) > Pr(tN = c | β′ = 1) ⇐⇒ k <
η2
2+3η2−4η .




6. It follows that Pr(tL = c | β′ = 1) > Pr(tN = c | β′ = 1).
Case 3. Suppose that β′− = 1. Using the same arguments as Case 1, we derive





Pr(tN = c | β′ = −1) =
k
 1
3η(1 − η) + 2
3η2 
1
3(1 + η){kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)η}
(33)
34It follows that,




Lemma 16 Suppose the prime minister belongs to party L. Suppose there is a blockade or that the
prime minister is incompetent. Suppose that the opposition party’s candidate is drawn from pool
2, and that the preceding regular election in period T had β = 0. Suppose that the prime minister
would not be nominated again if there was a regular election in T + 2. Suppose that the prime
minister will win an early election if and only if β  = −1. Let (1+δ)(1−kη2 −(1−k)η(1−η)) > 1,
then it is optimal both for a competent and an incompetent prime minister to call for an early
election.
Proof If the prime minister does not initiate early elections, her payoﬀ as of period T + 1 equals
1 because she can stay in oﬃce until T +2. If she wins an early election her expected payoﬀ equals
(1+δ)Pr(β′  = −1 | tL) because in case of winning she stays in oﬃce until T +3 and loses her oﬃce
otherwise. Suppose ﬁrst that tL = i. Then,
Pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i) = kPr(β′ = −1 | tR = c,tL = i)
+(1 − k)Pr(β′ = −1 | tR = i,tL = i)
= kη2 + (1 − k)η(1 − η)
Hence, an incompetent prime minister calls for early elections if
(1 + δ)(1 − kη2 − (1 − k)η(1 − η)) > 1 .
Now suppose that the prime minister is competent, then
Pr(β′ = −1 | tL = c) = kη(1 − η) + (1 − k)(1 − η)2
which is strictly smaller than Pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i). Hence a competent prime minister also opts
for early elections.
Lemma 17 Suppose Proposition 6 is true. Then, the expected utility, ˜ UE(θ), of voter type θ prior
to an election where both parties are nominating a newcomer and prior to learning the next period’s
g equals
˜ UE(θ) =




















































































αc := Pr(β′ = −1 | tL = c) = 1 − kη(1 − η) − (1 − k)(1 − η)2,
is the probability that a competent incumbent wins an early election and
αi := Pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i) = 1 − kη2 − (1 − k)η(1 − η),
is the probability that an competent incumbent wins. We denote by
σc := Pr(β′ = −1,tR = c | tL = c) = kPr(β′ = −1,| tR = c,tL = c) = kη(1 − η),
the joint probability that the incumbent loses and that the newcomer is competent given that the
incumbent is competent, and by
σi := kη2,
the joint probability that the incumbent loses and that the newcomer is competent given that the
incumbent is not competent. Analogously, the joint probability that the incumbent loses and that
the newcomer is incompetent is given by
γc := (1 − η)2(1 − k),
if the incumbent is competent and by
γi := η(1 − η)(1 − k),
if the incumbent is incompetent. Finally ρ = 1
2 is the probability that the opposition party’s candidate
has to be drawn from pool 2.
Proof An election where both nominate a newcomer leads to a large majority for party L (R) if
β = 1 (β = −1) which happens with probability 1
4. Conditional on β = 0 either party has an equal
chance of winning with a small majority. Hence,
˜ UE(θ) = 1
4[¯ Ll(θ) + ¯ Ls(θ) + ¯ Rs(θ) + ¯ Rl(θ)] , (35)
where ¯ Ll(θ) is the continuation utility if party L wins with a large majority and ¯ Ls(θ) is the
continuation utility that applies if the majority is small, etc.
In case of winning with a large majority, there is no political blockade. Hence,
¯ Ll(θ) = η¯ Llc(θ) + (1 − η)¯ Lli(θ) , (36)
36where
¯ Llc(θ) = (1 + δ2)(ge − 3θ2) + δ4 ˜ UE(θ) , (37)
and
¯ Lli(θ) = (ge − 3θ2 − 1) + δ2 ˜ UE(θ) , (38)
Again, by symmetry ¯ Ll(θ) = ¯ Rl(θ).
If party L wins with a small majority, then, the continuation utility ¯ Ls(θ) is given by
¯ Ls(θ) = 1
2 ¯ Lsc(θ) + 1
2 ¯ Lsi(θ) , (39)
where






b (θ) , (40)
and ¯ Lsc
nb is the continuation utility that applies if ω ≤ 0 and there is no blockade, and ¯ Lsc
b is the
continuation utility that applies otherwise. If there is no blockade, a competent prime minister can
prove his competence which implies that
¯ Lsc
nb(θ) = ¯ Llc(θ) (41)
With probability 1−ρ there is no early election but a regular election where both parties nominate
a newcomer. Hence,
¯ Lsc
b (θ) = (ge − 3θ2 − 3θ − 1) + (1 − ρ)δ2 ˜ UE(θ) + ρXc(θ), (42)
where
Xc(θ) := αc[δ(ge − 3θ2) + δ3 ˜ UE(θ)] + σcδ ¯ Rlc(θ) + γcδ ¯ Rli(θ)
Analogously, we derive
¯ Lsi(θ) = (ge − 3θ2 − 1) + (1 − ρ)δ2 ˜ UE(θ) + ρXi(θ) (43)
where
Xi := αi[δ(ge − 3θ2 − 1) + δ3 ˜ UE(θ)] + σiδ ¯ Rlc(θ) + γiδ ¯ Rli(θ)
The expressions for party R are derived in the same way. Substituting all the resulting expressions
into (35) establishes the Lemma.
The remaining steps to complete the proof of Proposition 6 are similar to those for the proof of
Proposition 5. We therefore only sketch the arguments.22 We ﬁrst verify that Lemma 10 also holds
22Details are available from the authors upon request.
37in the current setting. The arguments and the results are exactly the same as in the proof of Lemma
10. We further verify that an early election is indeed such that the incumbent wins with a large
majority if β  = −1 and that the opposition party wins with a large majority otherwise. Therefore
it is necessary to use the appropriate posterior beliefs on candidate competence when computing
expected utility conditional on the outcome of the early election campaign and to adjust for the
fact that the incumbent has a shorter time horizon than the newcomer. Given these modiﬁcations,
the arguments and the results which characterize the outcome of early elections are same as in the
proof of Lemma 10. Finally, we show that also Lemmas 11-14 go through.
38